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ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN CALIFORNIA
PRISONS AFTER DELANCIE V. SUPERIOR
COURT: CIVIL LIBERTY OR CIVIL DEATH?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere with
the administration of prisons and jails.1 For years, prison officials enjoyed relative autonomy in formulating and implementing prison policy, and all but the most grievous prisoner
complaints were denied judicial review. Consequently, prison
reform and recognition of prisoner's rights have been agonizingly slow.' By the late 1960's, however, courts began to scrutinize practices which had deprived prisoners of their basic
human rights. As a result, the scope of constitutional protections accorded prisoners has dramatically expanded in the
past decade.'
Nonetheless, vestiges of judicial restraint remain, particularly in areas where individual rights clash with governmental
interests associated with the maintenance and security of prisons.' One such area includes the various administrative
0 1982 by Carla Henry
1. This policy of judicial restraint arose from the belief that the "power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations" is entrusted to prison administrators. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). See also Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32,
34 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952).
2. See generally Note, Decency and Fairness:An Emerging Judicial Role in
Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841 (1971).
3. As one commentator notes:
Courts have recognized that inmates are entitled to due process of law
in disciplinary proceedings. Prisoner litigants successfully have attacked
regulations and practices that impinge upon freedom of speech, freedom
of religion, the right of association, and the right to receive medical care.
Furthermore, courts have extended established rights such as access to
the courts, equal protection of the laws, and freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment.
Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth Amendment out of Correctional Facilities,62 VA. L. Rev. 1045, 1045-46 (1976). See generally Comment, Prisonersand Their Basic Human Rights, 11 IDAHO L. REv. 45 (1974).
4. The United States Supreme Court has identified some of these governmental
interests as: "The preservation of internal order and discipline, the maintenance of
institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of
prisoners." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
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searches routinely conducted by prison authorities.5 While
most of these searches are now subject to some degree of constitutional restraint,' the practice of electronically monitoring
and recording prisoners' private conversations has been
viewed as such a valuable security measure that it has survived numerous constitutional and statutory challenges.
Thus, routine electronic surveillance continues unquestioned
and unhampered by conventional constraints.
This comment examines the judiciary's traditional approach to the practice of electronic prison surveillance and
suggests that this approach may no longer be valid in light of
the recent development of prisoner's constitutional and civil
rights. This analysis is particularly relevant to California
courts which are faced with the task of restructuring their
search and seizure law in the wake of the passage of Proposition 8.

II.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

Constitutional challenges to prison surveillance have primarily centered around the fourth amendment.'
A.

The Right of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment

The fourth amendment search and seizure clause guarantees the individual's right to conduct his affairs in private by
prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures."' While the
5. Administrative searches generally include body searches, cell searches, mail
inspection, and electronic surveillance.
6. See e.g., United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1973) (copying of
prisoner's letter violative of fourth amendment); Palmigiano v. Travison, 317 F.
Supp. 776 (D. R.I. 1970) (fourth amendment violated by indiscriminate opening of
prison mail); see generally Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 3, and W. LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.9 at 396-421 (1978).
7. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1345 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied; North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 308-09, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 833, 837 (1972).
8. Although challenges to the practice of prison surveillance based on other constitutional guarantees have been raised, discussion of such challenges are beyond the
scope of this comment.
9. The fourth amendment in its entirety provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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United States Supreme Court has held that electronic surveillance in a free society must be afforded fourth amendment
coverage, 10 analogous protection in the prison setting has been
limited to "privileged communications." 1 The constitutional
justifications for denying fourth amendment coverage to electronic surveillance in prisons rests on two theories: That prisons are not protected areas, and that prisoners do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.1"
The "constitutionally protected area" concept was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lanza v. New
York" involving the recording of a conversation between two
brothers in a jail visiting room. While relying on state grounds
in upholding the petitioner's conviction for his refusal to answer a legislative committee inquiry, the Court commented on
the constitutionality of such recordings. The majority found it
to be "obvious that a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room.""'
The Court concluded that prison surveillance had "traditionally been the order of the day.' 5
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis was developed in Katz v. United States, 6 which held that a recording of a conversation made in a public telephone booth had
violated the privacy upon which the petitioner had "justifiably relied.

'1 7

In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan enunci-

ated a two-prong test which affords fourth amendment protection whenever (1) the individual exhibits "an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy" and (2) the expectation is
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. Judicially and statutorily recognized "privileged communications" generally
include conversations between prisoners and professionals which traditionally have
been deemed confidential. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32
Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994 (1964) (recognizing the inmate's right
of privacy with respect to consultation with his attorney); CAL. PEN. CODE § 630
(West Supp. 1981). California Penal Code § 636 makes it a felony to eavesdrop or
record a conversation between a prisoner and "such person's attorney, religious advisers, or licensed physician." See also North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d
1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
12. See generally Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 3, at 1086-89; W. LAFAvE,
supra note 6, at 416-20.
13. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
14. Id. at 143.
15. Id.
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. Id. at 353.
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"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ",s
In most instances, the subjective prong proves fatal to an inmate's case, especially when the defendant knew or even sus-

pected that his conversation was being recorded.1e Even under
the objective prong of the Katz test, however, most courts are
unwilling to declare an expectation of privacy in jail as

reasonable.2 0
Regardless of the theory relied upon by a particular
court, the result is usually the same: Once the government advances a security rationale for a "tap," "the fourth amend-

ment question is essentially resolved in its favor."

18. Id. at 361.
19. For example, in People v. Califano, 5 Cal. App. 3d 476, 85 Cal. Rptr. 292
(1970) where a tape recording began: "They [the police] are probably listening right
now. [Laughter]" Id. at 480. The court found the suspect's remarks "clearly provided
a sufficient basis for a reasonable finding that neither participant in the conversation
entertained any subjective expectation of privacy." Id. at 482. In People v. Estrada,
93 Cal. App. 3d 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1979), the defendant told his sister at the
beginning of a visit that their conversations were being recorded and the two proceeded to speak in Spanish and "Pig-Latin Spanish." The court found the defendant
failed to show that he "had reason to believe his communications were confidential
and would remain private." Id. at 99.
20. In People v. Finchum, 33 Cal. App. 3d 787, 109 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1973), two
suspects were placed alone together in an interview room and told to "get their stories straight." The court found that "[h]ope [of privacy] would be the most that anyone in such a situation could have had, and hope falls short of what the law recognizes as a reasonable expectation." Id. at 791. In People v. Blehm, 44 Colo. App. 472,
623 P.2d 411 (1980), a pre-trial detainee spoke with his wife over a telephone intercom system. The court held there was no justifiable expectation that the conversations were private.
21. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1000 (1978). But see North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305,
104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972). In North a detective left a pre-trial detainee and his wife
alone in the detective's office. The court found that the prisoner and his wife were
"lulled into believing that the conversation would be confidential." Id. at 311. In
reaching the conclusion that the Katz standard had been satisfied, the court relied
heavily on the fact that the detective had deliberately created a sense of privacy and
that the conversation between spouses is usually deemed confidential. In Robinson v.
Superior Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 389, hearing granted, June 25, 1980 (Cal. No. S.F.
24185), the court found North controlling where husband and wife booked into jail
were placed in an interview room together and had their conversations recorded. The
court was apparently swayed by the fact that the couple had initially been placed in
two adjoining interview rooms and they had tried to communicate with each other
through the wall. After trying unsuccessfully to monitor and tape their conversation,
the officers placed the wife in the husband's interview room. People v. Harrell, 87
A.D.2d 21, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982), however, involved a conversation between a teenage suspect and his mother in a jail cell. A police detective stood by the cell for
"security reasons" and overheard incriminating statements. The court found that the
conversation should have been suppressed at trial because of the confidential nature
of parent-child communications.
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B. Title III: The Anti-Surveillance Statute
Most statutory challenges to electronic surveillance in
prison are based on Title III of the Omnibs Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968."2 Title III establishes procedural
safeguards for authorized surveillance and prohibits the unauthorized use of electronic devices to intercept wire or oral
communications. The Act defines "wire communication"' 8 as
any communication transmitted over a common carrier, while
"oral communication" is defined as any utterance "by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectations."'
Where a prisoner challenges a "wiretap" involving an internally operated communication system which is independent from any public system, the intercepted communication
is not entitled to Title III protection because it was not transmitted over a common carrier.' 5 The application of Title III to
oral communication within prisons has been equally limited
because Title III, like Katz, defines "oral communication"
with respect to the speaker's expectation of privacy.' Courts
are in disagreement, however, as to whether the Act's prohibitions extend to public telephones installed in a prison. Some
courts find telephone conversations are protected because a
public telephone is a "common carrier" within the meaning of
Title III.17 Recently, however, a few courts, relying on a spe22. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)) [hereinafter Omnibus
Crime Control Act].
23. Id. at § 802. The entire definition of wire communication reads:
"Wire communication" means any communication made in whole or in
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications
by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of
origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person
engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for
the transmission of interstate or foreign communications.

Id.
24. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802.
25. See, e.g., People v. Santos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 397, 102 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1972);
People v. Blehm, 44 Colo. App. 472, 623 P.2d 411 (1980).
26. See, e.g., People v. Suttle, 90 Cal. App. 3d 572, 153 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893, 402 N.E.2d 470, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829
(1980).
of appeals'
27. See, e.g., Nauton v. Craven, 521 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1975) (court
1295, 101
P.2d
495
885,
3d
Cal.
6
Court,
Superior
v.
dictum followed Halpin); Halpin
Cal. Rptr. 375, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (contents of conversation between
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cific exclusionary provision in the Act, have held otherwise.28
Although Title III preempts analogous state legislation,
states are free to adopt more stringent standards than those
requied by Title III." As a general rule, however, challenges
to prison surveillance on state statutory grounds have also
proved unsuccessful.8 0
C.

Criticism of the Traditional Approach

The theory that a jail is not a "constitutionally protected
area" has been repeatedly criticized by numerous commentators. " These experts point out that the "area" analysis as

enunciated in Lanza was dicta in an opinion adopted by only
four Justices over the strong objection of three dissenting Jus-

tices.8 Moreover, the "area" analysis of fourth amendment re-

pre-trial detainee and wife inadmissable because the conversation was intercepted
without judicial authorization). See also, Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir.
1979); People v. Tebo, 37 Mich. App. 141, 194 N.W. 2d 517 (1971).
28. United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 974
(1980); Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 497 F. Supp. 500 (D. Conn. 1980).
These courts found sections 2510 (5)(a)(i) and (ii) of Title III does not proscribe interceptions of communication over equipment used by police in ordinary course of
business. Section 2510(5)(a) excludes from the statutory definition of "electronic,
mechanical or other device" any telephone "(i) furnished to the subscriber.., in the
ordinary course of its business" or "(ii) being used . . . by an investigative or law
enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 (5)(a)(i),
2510 (5)(a)(ii). The First Circuit has specifically rejected the exception carved out by
the Croaker and Paul courts. In Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979), the
First Circuit affirmed a district court ruling which held prison officials liable to plaintiff prisoners in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action.
29.

C.

FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING §

5 (1978).

30. People v. Estrada, 93 Cal. App. 3d 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1979) (conversation over jail intercom system was not "confidential communication" within the
meaning of the California Invasion of Privacy Act). See, e.g., People v. Blehm, 44
Colo. App. 472, 623 P.2d 411 (1980) (conversation between pre-trial detainee and wife
over jail intercom system not covered by state surveillance statute); Commonwealth
v. Look, 279 Mass. 893, 402 N.E.2d 470, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827, (1980) (conversation overheard through police intercom system was not prohibited by Massachusetts
anti-surveillance statute). But see Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979)
(conversation overheard on extension phone at police station inadmissible); People v.
Tebo, 37 Mich. App. 141, 194 N.W.2d 517 (1971) (listening on extension phone not
within ordinary duties of policemen).
31. See generally Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 3, at 1055-58; W. LAFAVE,
supra note 6, at 416-17; Singer, Privacy, Autonomy and Dignity in the Prison: A
PreliminaryInquiry Concerning ConstitutionalAspects of the DegradationProcess
in Our Prisons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 669, 673-74 (1972).
32. Only seven Justices took part in the decision. The plurality opinion was
written by Justice Stewart with Justice Harlan and Justice Frankfurter writing separate concurring opinions. Dissenting opinions were written by Chief Justice Warren,
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view was purportedly rejected in Katz which declared that the
38
fourth amendment "protects people, not places." In recognition of these facts, many courts have implicitly rejected the
"area" analysis by extending the protection of the fourth
amendment to prisoners." A few courts have explicitly rejected Lanza as authority.3
In addition to finding the Lanza approach questionable,
many commentators criticize the routine use of the subjective
prong of Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to reject prisoners' claims of privacy.30 These commentators fear
that subjective expectations may be defeated by state announcements that it intends to conduct comprehensive electronic surveillance. They argue that to be consistent with the
spirit of Katz, the expectation of privacy should be measured
under an objective balancing test which carefully considers
the facts and circumstances of each case.
The United States Supreme Court appears to have taken
7
heed of these criticisms. In Bell v. Wolfish' a pretrial detainee alleged that certain cell and body searches violated his
fourth amendment right of privacy. Writing for the majority,"
Justice Rehnquist first pointed out that if a detainee has any
expectation of privacy, it "necessarily would be of a diminished scope."' 9 Justice Rehnquist, however, assumed arguendo
that the petitioner had an expectation of privacy, and proJustice Brennan, with Justice Douglas concurring in both opinions. See 370 U.S. 139,
147-53.
33. 389 U.S. at 351.
34. See, e.g., Burns v. Wikienson, 333 F. Supp. 94, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (D. R.I. 1970). See also infra notes 80-81 and
accompanying text.
35. United States v. Hinkley, 672 F.2d 115, 128 n.98 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United
States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009, 1013 (10th Cir. 1978); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d
1311, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (majority opinion by
Stevens, J., as circuit judge).
36. See Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 3, at 1060; W. LAFAv, supra note 6, at
417-18; Singer, supra note 31, at 678-79 n.26. See also United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
38. Justice Powell concurred in part but dissented from the majority holding
that strip searches could be conducted on less than probable cause. Justice Powell
felt that "at least some level of cause such as reasonable suspicion" should be required. Id. at 563. Justice Marshall filed a separate dissenting opinion in which he
agreed with the lower courts' ruling that strip searches could only be concluded on a
showing of probable cause. Justice Brennan joined Justice Stevens' dissent. Id.
39. Id. at 557.
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ceeded to uphold the searches based on their "reasonableness." This approach suggests that the Court may prefer to
avoid the Katz and Lanza analyses altogether.
Aside from its questionable theoretical foundation, the
traditional approach may also be criticized for the inequities
which often result from its application. In their overzealous
deference to administrative expertise, courts have blindly accepted any security rationale, regardless of factual circumstances which suggest that security concerns did not motivate
the surveillance. For example, in several cases, suspects were
placed together in rooms wired for sound and encouraged to
talk."° Even practices which would ordinarily invalidate a
search can survive traditional analysis. In one case, a California court of appeal upheld the admissability of a jailhouse
"tap" despite the fact that the conversation had been recorded by a district attorney for the purpose of investigating
an underlying murder charge.4 Cases such as these exemplify
the injustices which can result from the mechanical application of the traditional approach.
III.

CALIFORNIA'S DILEMMA

Until recently, California courts followed the traditional
approach by finding that there was no right of privacy or reasonable expectation of privacy in prisons.4 2 Since 1979, however, the California Supreme Court has granted hearings in
several cases ' which had questioned routine electronic sur40. See, e.g., Williams v. Nelson, 457 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1972); People v.
Finchum, 33 Cal. App. 3d 787, 109 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1973). See also W. LAFAvE, supra
note 6, at 420.
41. People v. Estrada, 93 Cal. App. 3d 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1979). Although
no mention of the district attorney's activities or his motivation appear in the above
cited case, a civil case brought by Estrada and fellow inmates gives a detailed description of how Estrada's conversation was obtained. See Smith v. Geary, No. C-75-D174RFP slip op. (N.D. Cal. 1981); Plaintiffs' Opening Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavits in Support of Plaintiffs' Complaint for Civil Rights Violations, Smith v. Geary, No. C-75-D174-RFP (N.D. Cal. 1981).
42. See, e.g., People v. Dominquez, 121 Cal. App. 3d 481, 175 Cal. Rptr. 445
(1981); People v. Penrod, 112 Cal. App. 3d 738, 169 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980); People v.
Owen, 112 Cal. App. 3d 441, 169 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1980); People v. Estrada, 93 Cal.
App. 3d 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1979).
43. DeLancie v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1979), vacated, 31 Cal. 3d
865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1982); Robinson v. Superior Court, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 389, hearing granted, June 25, 1980 (Cal. No. S.F. 24185); People v. Maxie, 165
Cal. Rptr. 4, hearing granted, July 16, 1980, (No. Crim. 21556); Prince v. Superior
Court, L.A. 31508, hearing granted, Dec. 7, 1981, dismissed as moot, Feb. 10, 1982
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veillance in prisons. The court decided one of these cases, DeLancie v. Superior Court," in 1982.
A.

DeLancie v. Superior Court
1. The decision

In DeLancie, several taxpayers and a pretrial detainee
brought an individual and class action to challenge the legality of the surveillance practices in the San Mateo County jail.
Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, the plaintiffs
claimed that the surveillance violated a number of constitutional rights because it was undertaken for the purpose of
gathering incriminating evidence. 45 The jail officials allegedly
monitored and recorded conversations in visiting areas and
prison cells.46 These surveillance practices were conducted
routinely at the discretion of the officials.
The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, the court of appeal reversed in part. The
California Supreme Court then granted a hearing.
Although the plaintiffs had not specifically alleged a violation of Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601, the supreme
court chose to base its decision on these code sections rather
than on constitutional grounds. Section 2600 provides that
"[a] person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may,
during any such period of confinement, be deprived of such
rights, and only such rights, as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonablesecurity of the institutionin which he
is confined and for the reasonable protection of the public."'47
(cal.).
44. 31 Cal. 3d 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1982).
45. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the rights of privacy guaranteed by Article I,
§ 1 of the California Constitution, the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment, Article I, § 13 of the California Constitution, the first amendment right of free
speech and religion, the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff also alleged violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20). 31 Cal. 3d at 869-70, 647 P.2d at 14647, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
46. Visitors in San Mateo County Jail are separated from inmates by a plexiglass sound-proof partition. Conversations are conducted over telephone-like receivers which are wired to a control monitor. A guard is also stationed in the room at a
discreet distance. In short, an illusion of privacy is created. Id. at 868, 647 P.2d at
144, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
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Section 2601 sets out the civil rights which state prisoners are
entitled to, including the right "to have personal visits, provided that the department may provide such restrictions as
are necessary for the reasonable security of the institution."48
The predecessor of sections 2600 and 2601 was the "civil
death" statute under which the prisoner lost all civil rights
and responsibilities. The DeLancie court reasoned that the
abandonment of the "civil death" concept indicated that the
legislature is concerned with the protection rather than evisceration of the prisoners' rights, and that pretrial detainees
were entitled to no less protection. Thus, the court held that
the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for declaratory and
injunctive relief under sections 2600 and 2601 because their
"complaint alleged that the jail officials' monitoring practice
was undertaken for the purpose of gathering evidence for use
in criminal proceedings, rather than to maintain the security
of the jail."'
After concluding that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action, the court rejected the argument that monitoring and
recording detainee's conversations was, as a matter of law, a
necessary security measure. The dicta in previous decisions
was not dispositive in the present case because section 2601
had not yet been enacted. 0 Similarly, the court rejected the
proposition that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of
privacy because it contradicted the policies underlying sections 2600 and 2601.
The court, however, was divided on the question of
whether posting signs warning of surveillance would defeat
the inmate's reasonable expectation of privacy. The majority,"' sharing the same concerns held by the critics of the
Katz's subjective prong, held that the government could not
defeat a detainee's right of privacy simply by announcing its
intention to intrude in advance. Justice Mosk, however, disagreed with the majority's reasoning, by focusing on the "conCODE § 2601(d) (West 1982).
49. 31 Cal. 3d at 877, 647 P.2d at 149, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
50. The court was referring to dicta in North v. Superior Court which stated
that the monitoring of inmates' conversations "seems reasonably necessary in order

48. CAL. PENAL

to maintain jail security.

"

Cal. 3d 301, 312, 502 P.2d 1305, 1311-12, 104 Cal.

Rptr. 833, 839 (1972).
51. Justice Kaus wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Richardson and
Justice Moak each wrote dissenting opinions.
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trolled environment" of the prison and arguing that notices
would only publicize what an inmate of "average intelligence"
should expect." Justice Kaus, however, opined that jail officials would not find posting signs to their advantage because
"secret monitoring is necessary for security purposes.
"68
2. Analysis
DeLancie is undoubtedly a deviation from the traditional
approach. While it may be argued that the court's decision to
base its holding on statutory grounds is indicative of its refusal to attack the traditional approach, a more plausible argument is that courts generally prefer statutory grounds for
resolving an issue rather than constitutional ones." Moreover,
DeLancie suggests that the majority of the court is of the
opinion that prisoners are entitled to some protection from
electronic surveillance. The fact that hearings were granted in
DeLancie and its companion cases is evidence of this attitude.
DeLancie, however, is not as far-reaching as one would
expect. The court simply held that detainees could obtain an
injunction and declaratory relief if they could show as a matter of fact that the challenged surveillance was not conducted
for security reasons. Implicit in this holding is the acceptance
of the declarations in sections 2600 and 2601 that security
concerns are paramount. It appears that prison officials have
unlimited powers to ensure the security of the prison and its
inmates.
Aside from the blind endorsement of prison security
needs, DeLancie's impact is also limited by the fact that it
places the burden of proof on the detainee. As the court put
it: "Plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court so that they
may attempt to prove the factual allegations of their com52. 31 Cal. 3d at 882, 647 P.2d at 152, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
53. Id. at 879. Justice Kaus concurred with the majority based upon his "understanding that the majority's recital of the allegation in the complaint that the monitoring was 'without probable cause to suspect that any illegal activity [was] taking
place' does not imply that monitoring for jail security purposes can only be undertaken on 'probable cause.'" Id. at 878.
54. As the majority itself stated: "It is a well established principle that courts
should avoid resolving constitutional issues if a case can be decided on statutory
grounds." Id. at 877 n.13 (citing People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 3d 663, 667, 547 P.2d
1000, 1003, 128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (1976)). See People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal. 3d 475, 48485, 462 P.2d 580, 587, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724, 731 (1969).
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plaint."5' Justice Kaus in his concurring opinion pointed out
the practical problem raised, noting that he had "no idea how
plaintiffs propose to prove that the monitoring is being performed solely to gather evidence and not for security purposes. . ... -" The difficulty of proof, together with the unlikelihood that detainees would even discover that their
conversations are being monitored, severely limits DeLancie.
Finally, DeLancie leaves an important question unanswered: May the evidence obtained for prosecutorial purposes
be used in a criminal trial? It may be argued that evidence
obtained for the prosecution of a detainee violates sections
2600 and 2601 and should therefore be excluded from trial. As
the following section will explain, the answer to this question
must be found in federal case law.
B. Proposition8
On June 8, 1982, California voters approved Proposition 8
(the "Victims' Bill of Rights")."7 Among its provisions, Proposition 8 includes a constitutional amendment which provides
for the admissibility of all "relevant evidence" in any criminal
prosecution. 8 In effect, this "truth-in-evidence" provision replaces California's exclusionary standard with that of the federal standard."9
55. 31 Cal. 3d at 877, 647 P.2d at 150, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
56. Id. at 878, 647 P.2d at 150, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
57. For the entire text of Proposition 8, see 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1164-69
(West).
58. The "truth-in-evidence" provision of Proposition 8 provides:
(d) Right to truth-in-evidence.Except as provided by statute hereafter
enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of Legislature, a relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in
any trial or hearing of a juvenile for criminal offense, whether heard in
juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence
Code, Section 353, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any
existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.
Id. at 1165.
59. The California Supreme Court recently held that Proposition 8 satisfied the
constitutional requirement that voter initiatives embrace a "single subject." Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982). In addition to
finding the "single subject" rule embodied in CAL. CONST., art. II, § 8(d) had not been
violated, the court also held that "the failure of the initiative measure to identify the
statutory provisions that were amended or repealed by implication did not render it
void." Id. at 255-57, 651 P.2d at 284-86, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 40-43. Finally, the court
held that Proposition 8 did not constitute an impermissible revision of the state con-
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While the constitutionality of the specific provisions of
Proposition 8 has yet to be examined by the court, it appears
the "truth-in-evidence" provision meets the standard requirements of constitutionality." The impact of this provision on
DeLancie is unclear. Although DeLancie's holding remains
unaffected, the inference that evidence obtained for the purpose of prosecution in violation of sections 2600 and 2601
would be inadmissible may no longer be valid. Proposition 8,
therefore, may have undermined the only meaningful aspect
of DeLancie.
IV.

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

In prison surveillance cases, the federal courts adhere to
the traditional approach.6 1 As indicated previously, this approach has been heavily criticized for being analytically unsound and frequently unjust. The traditional approach is also
undermined by the recent development of prisoners' constitutional rights.
A. Emergence of
Communication

Prisoners' Right

of

Privacy and

That the "right of privacy" has become increasingly more
valued in modern society is evidenced by the fact that some
states provide an explicit right of privacy in their constitutions, while others have enacted privacy statutes.2 Accordingly, courts have expanded the right of privacy to include
stitution. Id. at 260-61, 651 P.2d at 288-89, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
60. In fact, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District has recently
upheld the constitutionality of the "truth-in-evidence" amendment and held that the
amendment abrogates California Penal Code § 1538.5 (suppression of tainted evidence) as well as California's decisional law, which imposed a higher standard for
searches and seizures than federal law. The California Supreme Court granted the
defendant's petition for hearing and will review the case. Wilson v. Superior Court,
185 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1982), hearinggranted, (Cal. Nov. 18, 1982) (L.A. 31668) (validity
of a search for drugs in entertainer Flip Wilson's suitcase at the Los Angeles airport).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1977).
62. For example, the Montana Constitution provides: "The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." MoNT. CONST., art. II, § 10 (amended
1972). See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1 (amended 1974).
The Massachusetts privacy statute provides: "A person shall have a right against
unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy. The superior court
shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in connection therewith to
award damages." MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 214, § 1B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974).
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new areas and interests. s
In keeping with this trend, some courts and promulgators
of model codes are accepting the view that various aspects of
an individual's right of privacy survive the imposition of confinement. As a result, courts are subjecting heretofore unchallenged prison practices to constitutional scrutiny and demanding justification for official conduct which infringes upon
privacy rights relating to personal dignity and property as
well as liberty of choice, expression, and association. For example, several courts have extended the right of privacy to the
unclothed body of an inmate.' In one recent case, a federal
district court in California held that the inmates' privacy outweighed the state's need to insure prison security through unrestricted observation." Similarly, many courts now recognize
that prisoners have a right of privacy in "legitimate" personal
possessions such as diaries, books, and clothing."' Less tangible interests, such as the right to marry free from unreasonable restrictions are also protected. 7
Consistent with the growing concern for the protection of
prisoners' right of privacy is the increased protection of prisoners' communication rights. 5 It was the recognition that
communication in the form of visitation, telephone contact,
and letters had a marked effect on the prisoners' general wellbeing and morale that first prompted closer examination of
63. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (single-family
zoning ordinance violated individual's privacy concerning family arrangements);
Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 960, petition for reconsiderationdenied, 400 U.S. 954 (1970) (The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found film containing scenes of mental patients at a
correctional institution made without obtaining individual releases invaded inmates'
privacy.)
64. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1980); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D.
Tex. 1974).
65. Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
66. Diguiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (prisoners have a
protectable interest in the secrecy of their diaries); O'Connor v. Keller, 510 F. Supp.
1359 (D. Md. 1981) (prisoners have a property and a privacy interest in books and
tapes); Stringer v. Thompson, 537 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. I1. 1982) (prisoner has a property and a privacy interest in clothing and legal documents).
67. Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105 (D. Nev. 1980).
68. In addressing the right of the media to conduct face to face interviews with
inmates, the United States Supreme Court held that the first amendment requires
prison administrators to make sure that "reasonable and effective means of communication remain open." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974).
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prison restrictions. It is now accepted that arbitrary or unnecessarily broad limitations may run afoul of several constitutional rights.""

A growing number of courts have held that an inmate's
right to communicate with friends and family may be guaranteed by the right of association of the first amendment.70
Since in some instances the right of privacy and communication are intertwined, a few courts have suggested that visitation areas which lack sufficient privacy may effectively chill

the right of free association.71 One line of cases supports the
proposition that eavesdropping or monitoring telephone calls

is objectionable on first amendment grounds.7
Communication rights appear to take on an added dimension where the inmate is a pretrial detainee. While both detainees and prisoners have a right of visitation which may be
limited by reasonable security requirements, some courts are
less willing to defer to the "reasonableness" of a given security
measure in the case of pretrial detainees. As a result, these
courts have struck down absolute prohibitions on visitation
when less drastic measures such as denying visits to high risk
detainees can be taken.7 8 A few courts have even found that
74
detainees have a constitutional right to contact visitations.
69.

See

STANDARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF PiSONERS,

§ 6.2 Com-

mentary (Tent. Draft 1977), reprinted in 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 375, 377, 500-07
(1977).

70.

Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F. Supp. 1276, 1296 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Ramos v.

Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 150 (D. Colo. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981);
Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368, 1386 (W.D. Penn. 1978); O'Bryan v.
County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582, 598-99 (E.D. Mich. 1977), perm. injunction
granted, 446 F. Supp. 436 (1981); Lsman v. Helgemore, 437 F. Supp. 269, 320-21
(D.N. Hamp. 1977); Aherns v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977), modified,
570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Smith, 112 Cal. App. 3d 956, 964, 169 Cal. Rptr.
564 (1981).
71. McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 764 (W.D. La. 1982); Wicholson v.
Choctaw County, 498 F. Supp. 295, 310 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Moore v. Janning, 427 F.
Supp. 567, 575-76 (D. Neb. 1976).
72. Aherns v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977), modified, 570 F.2d
286 (8th Cir. 1978); Moore v. Janning, 427 F. Supp. 567, 576 (D. Neb. 1976); Mitchel
v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v.
Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157, 1169 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
73. Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 162 (D. Colo. 1980), cert. granted, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 110 (C.D. Cal. 1978);
O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582, 599 (E.D. Mich. 1977), perm. injunction granted, 446 F. Supp. 436 (1981); Wesson v. Johnson, 579 P.2d 1165, 1169
(Colo. 1978).
74. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1237 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, vacated,
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Promulgators of model prison codes have also become
more concerned with the protection of communication and
privacy rights. Consequently, some modern codes find that a
prisoner should be allowed private visitations. 5 Moreover, the
most recently published Federal Standard for Prisons states
that there is no need to monitor inmate-visitor conversations.7 6 Another model code maintains that the right of privacy protects all inmates conversations. This code provides
that electronic surveillance "of an inmate's room shall not occur unless proper authorization has been obtained by a court
'77
of law."
While the California Department of Corrections has not
formulated a rule with respect to electronic surveillance, it has
adopted a policy of visitation which is consistent with the
spirit of Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601(d). Specifically,
section 3170 of the California Administrative Code provides
that the privacy of a visit shall not be "imposed upon except
* . . for the identification of persons, and to maintain order
and acceptable conduct, and to prevent the introduction of
items... which inmates are not permitted to possess."7 The
California Supreme Court relied partly on this provision in
79
framing the DeLancie holding.
remanded, 442 U.S. 915 (1977) (currently on remand to the district court); Miller v.

Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1977); O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F.
Supp. 582, 598 (E.D. Mich. 1977), perm. injunction granted,446 F. Supp. 436 (1981);

Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 901-02 (Utah 1981). But see, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm,
639 F.2d 559, 580 n.26 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); In re Gallego, 133
Cal. App. 3d 75, 183 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1982). The Supreme Court referred to Marcera

in Bell v. Wolfuh but expressed "no opinion" regarding its holding that detainees
have a constitutional right to contact visits. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979).
75. See STANDARDS FOR INMATas' LEGAL RIGHTS Right 19 (National Sheriffs
Ass'n. 1974) reprinted in DzAaruur or JuSrics COMpENDIUM OF MODEL CoRmcTIONAL LEGISLATION & STANDARDS IV, 59 (2d ed. 1975); MODEL Acr FOR To PROMTCTION OF RIGHTS OF PRIoSms § 7 (National Council on Crime and Delinquency 1972).
76. FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAHs Rule 12.12 (United States Department of Justice 1980). Although the American Bar Association recently adopted
prison standards which allow for electronic surveillance, it suggests that such surveillance is only justifiable where prison authorities obtain "reliable information that a
particular communication may jeopardize the safety of the public or the security or
safety within a correctional institution, or is being used in furtherance of illegal activity." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 23-6.1 (2d ed. 1981).
77.

MODEL Rum AND REGULATiONS ON PRISONmS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIILITIES

Rule ID-6 (Boston University Center for Criminal Justice 1973).
78. CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 3170 (1982).

79.
(1982).

31 Cal. 3d 865, 874-75, 647 P.2d 142, 147-48, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871-72
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These courts and legislatures have realized that it is possible to preserve basic human rights and simultaneously accomplish the goals of our penal institutions. It is time that the
courts following the traditional approach adopt this enlightened view.
B. The Prisoners' Right of Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment
The majority's antiquated approach to electronic surveillance is even more unsettling in light of the emerging view
that fourth amendment protections "do not lapse at the jailhouse door." 80 Although the scope of these protections in the
prison setting is not yet clear, the list of cases providing at
least limited protection continues to grow. In marked contrast
to the electronic surveillance cases, those cases which have invalidated other administrative searches on fourth amendment
grounds are thoughtful and well-reasoned. In addressing the
challenged search, these courts have adopted a balancing test
which objectively weighs the government's interest in conducting the search against the individual's fourth amendment
interest, in light of all the relevant facts.
In addition, the burden of proving the reasonableness of a
search is placed on the party best able to bear it-the government. In assessing the reasonableness of a search, these courts
are scrutinizing the alleged purpose of the search and the
scope of the actual intrusion. Generally, a search is unreasonable if it is conducted arbitrarily or if its scope is overbroad.
The following survey will illustrate the application of this
analysis to various types of prison searches.
1. Strip Searches
Because of the belief that strip searches are an effective
means of detecting and detering the introduction of contraband into prisons, the courts afford prison authorities a great
deal of deference in strip search cases. In Bell v. Wolfish,81
pretrial detainees challenged the practice of routine strip
80. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 576 (1979). (Marshall, J., dissenting, citing
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932

(1978)); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1978).
81. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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searches which were conducted after every contact visit.82 The
Court upheld the search as reasonable and concluded that
each search could be conducted on less than probable cause
because of the "significant and legitimate interest" they
served.88 The Court stated that the test of reasonableness
under the fourth amendment is not mechanical but rather "a
balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must
consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it and the
place in which it is conducted."84 This balancing test, however, should afford prison administrators "wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that in their judgment are needed . . . to maintain institutional security." 8
The lower courts which have interpreted Wolfish generally agree that body searches are not "per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment," and find that Wolfish requires a balancing of interests in each case. 86 Courts look
closely for a demonstrated need for the search and weigh that
need against the degradation caused by the search. 7 Expert
testimony often plays a key role in this determination. 8
Moreover, some courts have held that Wolfish requires prison
officials to conduct strip searches pursuant to established procedure and in a nonabusive manner.8 ' Accordingly, when the
circumstances warrant, courts have found that some searches
82. The Court described the search procedure as follows: "If the inmate is a
male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates are also inspected. The inmate
is not touched by security personnel at any time during the visual search procedure."
Id. at 558 n.39 (citing Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978); Brief for
Petitioners at 70, 74 n.56, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520).
83. 441 U.S. at 558-60.
84. Id. at 559.
85. Id. at 547.
86. Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980); Frazier v. Ward, 528 F. Supp.
80, 81 (N.D. N.Y. 1981); Sims v. Brierton, 500 F. Supp. 813, 816 (D.C. I. 1980).
87. Frazier v. Ward, 528 F. Supp. 80, 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Sims v. Brierton, 500
F. Supp. 813, 817 (D.C. Ill. 1980).
88. See, e.g., Frazier v. Ward, 528 F. Supp. 80, 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (referring to
expert testimony which influenced previous declaratory judgment by the court
prohibiting body cavity searches on inmates); Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354,
1364-65 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
89. State v. Hartzog, 26 Wash. App. 576, 615 P.2d 480 (1980); Massey v. Wilson,
484 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1980).
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are unreasonable.9 0

2. Cell Searches
As with strip searches, Wolfish is the latest Supreme
Court pronouncement on prison cell searches. In Wolfish, jail
inmates objected to unannounced "shakedowns" during which
all inmates would be vacated while a team of guards searched
each cell. The lower courts struck down the search because no
"compelling necessity" had been demonstrated. The Supreme
Court, however, found the search reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Deferring to the prison officials,
the Court noted that the "shakedowns" were an appropriate
security measure.9'
While most decisions suggest that cell searches conducted
for legitimate security purposes are per se reasonable, 2 some
courts have found fourth amendment violations when the
scope of the search exceeded its legitimate objective. In
United States v. Hinckley,'3 a correctional officer, conducting
a routine contraband search of John Hinckley's cell, confis-

cated Hinckley's personal notes. The court of appeals noted
that while prison officials must be accorded deference in implementing cell searches, such discretion "must be corralled
by the fourth amendment's prohibition of arbitrary invasion
of privacy.' 94 Because Hinckley's writings could not in "any
real sense" jeopardize prison security,"s and there was no es90. See Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (denied prison officials relief from declaratory judgment which prohibited them from conducting visual
cavity searches on inmates returning from contact visits after finding such searches
violative of the fourth amendment); State v. Hartzog, 26 Wash. App. 576, 615 P.2d
480, 485 (1980) (found a courtroom security order which required a second probe
search prior to an inmate's entrance to the courtroom unnecessary and unreasonable).
See also Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980). In Sims v. Brierton, 500 F.
Supp. 813 (D.C. Ill. 1980) (court granted plaintiff prisoner's motion for a protective
order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c). The court prohibited prison officials from requiring the plaintiff to "submit to a body cavity search before or after his
deposition or before or after an attorney visit in preparation for the deposition." Id.
at 817. The court based its decision to grant the order on the prison's failure to show
a legitimate security interest as well as its failure to justify its restriction on the inmates' access to the court, stating: "Access to the courts conditioned on submission to
a degrading and unnecessary search is unduly restrictive." Id.
91. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559.
92. See, e.g., Olson v. Klecker, 642 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1981).
93. 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 129.
95. Id. at 132. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the government's
contention that the reading and subsequent seizure of Hinckley's papers was justified
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tablished practice or policy "that such reading was necessary
to maintain institutional or inmate security . . .," the court
concluded that the search was unreasonable."
In addition to demanding that the cell search be noncapricious, some courts are insisting that the search be implemented in the least disruptive manner with concern for the
inmate's property and privacy rights. e Moreover, there must
be a logical nexus between the item sought and the item
seized."8 Where prison authorities fail to comply with these
minimum standards, courts are finding fourth amendment
violations.ee
3. Mail Inspection
In Procunier v. Martinez,100 the Supreme Court found a
prison mail censorship scheme unconstitutional on first
amendment grounds because there was no showing that the
censorship was necessary to further a legitimate penological
because "while sorting through papers during an authorized search for contraband
[the officer] saw words that triggered an institutional need for further investigation."
Id. at 131. The court agreed with the trial court's finding that the words "prison,"
"life sentence," and "cooperation with the Justice Department" were hardly of a nature that suggests an imminent or even remote threat to security. Id. at 132.
96. Id. at 131. See also Diguiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(district court found that the words "August 8" did not justify the nonconsensual
reading of prisoner's diary during the course of "lockdown" following prison riot on
August 8).
97. See, e.g., Olson v. Klecker, 642 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1981); Clifton v. Robinson, 500 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Brown v. Helton, 492 F. Supp. 771 (D. N.J.
1980).
98. See, e.g., Stringer v. Thompson, 537 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. I1. 1982); O'Connor
v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359 (D. M.D. 1981).
99. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See supra text
accompanying notes 92-94. Diguiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503 (S.D. N.Y. 1981)
(district court granted plaintiff-prisoner's motion for summary judgment and
awarded damages upon finding the nonconsensual reading of plaintiff's diary during a
prison-wide cell search was an unreasonable invasion of the prisoner's privacy. The
court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the "shakedown" was conducted
two days after a prison riot in an effort to reinforce prison security); O'Connor v.
Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359 (D. M.D. 1981) (found confiscation of prisoner's books and
tapes during a prison-wide search where the purpose of the search was to uncover
sandpaper and prison authorities personally liable for damages). See also Clifton v.
Robinson, 500 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (district court held that prison officials
were not entitled to summary judgment where prisoner's complaint alleged that personal property damaged or destroyed during the disruptive cell search could establish
a fourth amendment violation); Stringer v. Thompson, 537 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (prisoner stated a cause of action under the fourth amendment where property
seized during prison-wide lockdown was neither illegal nor contraband).
100. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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objective. Although the Supreme Court has not recently addressed the issue of whether the fourth amendment provides
prisoners with protection from routine reading of prison
mail, 101 many lower courts have addressed this issue.
Most lower courts have imposed some degree of procedural safeguards on mail inspection 0 2 based on the first amendment.103 A few courts have held, however, that the fourth
amendment prohibits the indiscriminate reading of mail.1 4
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has held that a prisoner possesses a right of privacy in a sealed letter which cannot be
invaded absent a "showing of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment."105 Courts accepting this premise agree that the
reading of mail for the purpose of obtaining prosecutorial eviand have excluded all evidence is not a "justifiable purpose,"
106
trial.
from
dence obtained
101. In 1919, the Court held the fourth amendment did not extend to letters
written by an inmate where such letters "came into the possession of officials of the
penitentiary under established practice, reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the institution." Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1919).
102. These safeguards include inspection by mechanical device, the opening of
mail in the presence of the inmate, and scanning rather than reading the mail. For
inspection purposes, mail is usually divided into four different categories; incoming,
outgoing, personal, and privileged (letters to attorney, governor, etc.). As a general
rule, privileged outgoing mail is given the greatest degree of protection because it
constitutes the slightest threat to prison security.
103. Nicholson v. Choctow County, 498 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Owens-El
v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1978), final order, 457 F. Supp. 984, a/f'd &
rev'd, on other grounds, 612 F.2d 754 (1979); Vest v. Lubbock Cty. Comm'rs Court,
444 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. (N.D. Fla.
1976)..
104. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970). It is
interesting to note that while most courts are reluctant to extend explicit fourth
amendment protection to mail inspections, many court orders implicitly suggest such
protection by prohibiting the opening and inspection of mail unless the jail official
has probable cause (or its equivalent) to believe that the communication poses a
threat to security. See, e.g., supra note 104.
105. United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1981) (the court reaffirmed
its holding in Savage); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974).
106. State v. Ellefson, 266 S.C. 494, 224 S.E.2d 666 (1976) (reversed a conviction for breach of trust where evidence obtained by an outside investigator had been
admitted at trial); State v. Sheriff, 619 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981) (found letters opened
and photocopied by a jailor should have been excluded at trial because only opened
to obtain evidence, not to maintain security and discipline).
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APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

As we have seen, a growing number of courts have found
that prisoners retain a diminished right of privacy protected
by the fourth amendment. It has also become apparent that
the application of the fourth amendment to the prison setting
is not necessarily inconsistent with the need to maintain safe
prisons. The more complex question, however, concerns the
applicability of the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonable search and seizures to electronic surveillance.
In determining whether a particular search has violated
an inmate's constitutional rights, the preceeding survey of related case law and model codes offers some guidelines. 0 7
First, courts must consider the need for the search, taking
into consideration the proffered justification and the scope of
the search as well as the manner and place in which it was
conducted. Even though most authorities agree that security
concerns are paramount, courts should nonetheless give the
prisoner the opportunity to show that the challenged search
was not conducted for security reasons. California courts
should be mindful that the DeLancie court has held that the
existence of security concerns are a question of fact. 0 8
In addition, courts must balance the need for a particular
search against the nature of the individual rights intruded
upon. The manner and place of the recording plays an important role in this consideration. As with mail searches, the
practice of electronic surveillance has a chilling effect on the
first amendment right of expression and association. Surveillance of visiting rooms in a manner which creates a false pretense of privacy should be scrutinized carefully. Conversations
between a prisoner and his family and friends are extremely
intimate and, absent a most compelling interest, government
should not intrude on their privacy.
Courts should also be wary of the scope of a search. Many
courts now require that the scope of an intrusion be closely
tailored to its purpose. 09 Admittedly, this purpose-scope limitation may not be as workable in eavesdropping cases as it is
107. See supra notes 62-108 and accompanying text.
108. DeLancie v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 865, 875, 647 P.2d 142, 148, 183
Cal. Rptr. 866, 872 (1982).
109. See, e.g., supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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in other administrative searches which involve visual inspection for an item of contraband. It is virtually impossible to
scan a conversation to determine if recording is necessary.
Nevertheless, at times the parties to a conversation and the
surrounding circumstances may be indicative of its contents.
For example, it is unlikely that a prisoner would be discussing
escape plans with his eighty year old grandmother or six year
old child. In these cases, the government should have to show
that there was probable cause to believe that prison security
was threatened.
Because of the inadequacies of the purpose-scope limitation, the courts should impose a purpose-use limitation on the
information obtained through monitoring. While prison officials may have broad surveillance powers to ensure the security of an institution, it does not necessarily follow that the
state should be allowed to use, for prosecutorial purposes, all
information obtained through electronic surveillance. A distinction should be made between information which suggests
a genuine threat to security and that which does not. As such,
the state would be justified in using legitimate evidence of an
escape plot, but not evidence of a robbery which occured two
months earlier. Under our criminal justice system the state
and the pretrial detainee are adversaries, and the state bears
the burden of conviction. The courts have adopted the position that, because of the integrity of the judiciary and considerations of fair play, they will not consider evidence obtained
by the state through illegal means. By the same token, the
state should not be allowed to use any evidence which is obtained solely because of the defendant's confinement. The
state should not be allowed to abuse its procedural advantage
of arrest and confinement to "fish" for evidence necessary for
conviction. In short, evidence obtained for security reasons
should be used solely for security purposes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The judiciary's uncompromising deference to institutional
concerns for security shields prison surveillance from fourth
amendment protections. The enlightened view towards prisoners' rights which has evolved in recent decades should signal an end to this traditional approach. The inmates' right to
private conversations should be balanced against institutional
security needs. The government must substantiate its need for
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electronic surveillance and should follow procedural safeguards to ensure minimal infringement of prisoners' rights.
Moreover, the use of information obtained by electronic surveillance should be limited to furthering the security concerns
-which justified the initial intrusion.
By adopting this modern approach, inmate communication and privacy rights can realistically coexist with legitimate
security practices. This important balance of state and individual interests characterizes a sensitivity toward constitutional liberties and captures the spirit of the DeLancie
decision.
Carla Henry

